l what extent and how do great powers respond to each other's behavior? This question lies at the heart of much writing and thinking about international politics. Yet, surprisingly, we still do not have a definitive answer to it. One body of work argues that great powers' behaviors are an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine-that great powers are insensitive to the behavior of other countries. Another body of work maintains that great powers not only respond to the behavior of other powers but reciprocate the behaviors directed toward them. This reciprocity is presumed by some theorists to provide the basis for the evolution of international cooperation (see Quasi-experimental studies of reciprocity have produced contradictory findings. Some researchers claim to find widespread evidence of reciprocity as an international norm; others find evidence of bureaucratic momentum and a complete lack of reciprocity; and still others find reciprocity only in certain countries at certain times (see Zinnes 1980) .
Recently, a group of scholars has suggested that great powers respond not to the actual behaviors of other powers but to rational expectations of others' future policies or to departures from these expected policies. Because great powers have rational expectations, reciprocity is not immediately evident as a lagged response to another country's past actions AMERICAN We shall critically evaluate this debte about the nature of great power politics and provide a sound answer to the questions of whether and how great power behavior reflects bureaucratic routine or reciprocity. We show that the existing research on great power behavior is flawed in that it fails to appreciate China's relations with the superpowers and it suffers from specification and measurement errors. We construct an improved quasi experiment that includes Chinese behavior and ameliorates these methodological problems. The results of our analysis indicate that great power behavior combines both bureaucratic routine and reciprocity. Our results also reveal complex, asymmetrical connections among U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations-connections that imply the existence of a strategic triangle. The workings of the triangle differ somewhat from earlier descriptions (e.g., Starr 1982) but are largely consistent with the Kissingerian notion that U.S.-Soviet detente, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, and Sino-Soviet enmity are coordinated and self-reinforcing (Talbott 1981, 84 ).
The discussion is divided into four parts. First, we briefly review the quasiexperimental literature on the issue of bureaucratic momentum versus reciprocity. This review shows the need for a new approach that recognizes the causes and consequences of Chinese behavior, bases causal inference on a weakly restricted model of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, and employs multiple, temporally disaggregated time series for great power behavior. We present such an approach by developing a multiequation model for Sino-Soviet-U.S. relations and assembling three sets of events time series on these countries' behaviors. We then present the results of our analysis and briefly sketch some theoretical implications of the results.
Reciprocity and Reality:
A Short Review
The quasi-experimental studies of great power politics can be divided into three groups, depending on the indicator of behavior they employ; there are conflicting results regarding bureaucratic routine and reciprocity in each case.
The first and most extensive set of investigations focuses on military spending patterns. These studies attempt to determine whether the superpowers increase (decrease) their military spending in response to increases (decreases) in spending by the adversary. Many of these studies conclude that superpower military spending shows no evidence of reciprocity. Rather, military spending is an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine and other purely internal factors (see the reviews in Cusack and Ward 1981 and Ostrom and Marra 1986).
Recently, several researchers have proposed a new explanation for the apparent lack of reciprocity in military spending. These scholars argue that reciprocity is not evident because countries respond not to the actual spending levels of their adversary but only to errors in expected spending levels. For example, Williams and McGinnis (1988) In their framework, a cooperative initiative is essentially an unexpected or surprise act of cooperation on the part of one country toward another. It is defined, operationally, as the residuals from the respective equations in the fitted models for U.S.-Soviet relations. The correlation between these residuals presumably indicates the tendency of countries to take, and/or respond to, such initiatives simultaneously. The response of the fitted models to a hypothetical but historically grounded (estimated) residual shock indicates the likely effect that a surprise policy initiative will have on the two countries' behaviors. In these ways, the rational expectations framework allows researchers to conduct more realistic simulations of the effects of superpower policy initiatives than the more familiar "reactive linkage" framework (see McGinnis and Williams 1989a).
Unfortunately, these new studies also produce somewhat contradictory results. For instance, Majeski (1985) Second, existing studies suffer from measurement error. The data base for many of them is highly aggregated in a temporal sense. Temporal aggregation tends to mask causal relationships. For example, temporal aggregation can transform one-way causal relationships into feedback (reciprocal) relationships; and it increases the importance of instantaneous feedback or contemporaneous correlation-the main indicator of mutual responsiveness according to the rational expectations school. The implication is that some of the results mentioned above may be flawed by the use of annual data -data that span the true or natural time unit of countries' policymaking processes and hence confound causal inferences. If more disaggregated data were used, we would obtain more accurate and consistent results about great power behaviors.6
Of course, military spending data normally are available only on an annual basis. Events data, on the other hand, can be disaggregated to monthly levels. This allows us to address the inferential problems mentioned above. With events data 21 we can, for example, resolve the inconsistencies between the results obtained by Starr (1982) and Rajmaira and Ward (1988) .7 Finally, the general quality of events data (Achen 1987 ) requires the use of multiple indicators of behaviors. We need more than one (temporally disaggregated) time series to gauge the reliability of our results.
To resolve the debate about bureaucratic routine and reciprocity in great power relations, then, we must construct an improved quasi experiment that ameliorates the specification and measurement errors in existing research.
Research Design Model and Method
We used the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach to test the three propositions.8 This approach addresses the problem of specification uncertainty, and it also yields insights into the effects of ( The second proposition, that the three countries' behaviors are outgrowths of rational expectations, implies that because the three countries all have rational expectations, their behaviors are random walks. But this second proposition, unlike the first, implies that shocks (surprises) in countries' behaviors toward one another -the residuals from the six equationsare highly intercorrelated. And reciprocity will be found in the sense that a (simulated) unexpected positive surge of cooperation in the policies of one country toward another produces a cooperative response toward it by the latter.
The third proposition suggests that in addition to the possibility that some of the coefficients on the right-hand-side endogenous variables are nonzero ("routine"), there are also nonzero coefficients on response variables, indicating direct bilateral response, or perhaps triangular responsess. In the USt equation, for instance, the coefficients l13i might be nonzero, indicating bilateral response of the United States toward the Soviet Union; and/or the CX14j, a 15i, or ?Xi6i coefficients might be nonzero, suggesting triangular responsess. Like the second proposition, the third proposition implies that countries react in kind to a surprise act of cooperation toward them and perhaps toward other countries.
Data
In order to counteract measurement error, we assembled three events data sets. The first data set, Azar Each data set was transformed into six monthly time series-one for each country's behavior toward each of the other two-representing levels of net cooperation (weighted cooperation minus weighted hostility). Each monthly data point was the weighted sum of actions taken by one country toward another during the month, with each action weighted according to the amount of cooperation or hostility implicit in the category of action taken. The presumption here is that policymakers think in terms of monthly aggregations of events and that in so doing they weigh the relative balance of cooperative and hostile actions that a country has taken.'0 Our net cooperation time series are displayed graphically and discussed at length elsewhere (Goldstein and Freeman Two criticisms might nonetheless be leveled at our measurement strategy. The first is that policymakers do not weigh cooperative and hostile acts together but rather treat them in fundamentally different ways, reacting mainly to hostile events (McGinnis and Williams 1989a; Rajmaira and Ward 1988) . Recognizing this possibility, we also analyzed a set of COPDAB time series constructed from hostile events only. As reported below, we obtained essentially the same results in this ancillary analysis as for our analyses of the net cooperation time series. A second criticism derives from the nature of events data, which are thought to be unduly "noisy." Coding and weighting of reported events from the press gives only a rough approximation of countries' behaviors. The monthly movements in countries' measured behaviors may well contain random fluctuations. Statistical analyses of such data accordingly will be biased against finding causal links between one country's behavior and the prior behavior of another country. In our case, the use of events data biases our analyses toward confirming propositions 1 and 2 while disconfirming proposition 3; that is, our measurement strategy creates a very stringent test of the third proposition-a test that makes it difficult to find much evidence of direct reciprocity between great powers because events data are so noisy. Nonetheless, in fact, our results support the third proposition. So our findings cannot be criticized on the grounds of these data problems.
Model Calibration and Evaluation
In calibrating our model we were sensitive to the fact that the nature of SinoSoviet-U.S. relations may have changed at various times over the last forty years as a consequence, for example, of leadership changes in the three countries. The coefficients of the model in equations 1-6 therefore may take on different values in different historical eras." In addition, the three teams that coded the data sets may have emphasized different characteristics of the three countries' policymaking processes; and as a result the lag structures of the statistical models for the three data sets might be different.
With both these considerations in mind, we analyzed the three data sets with respect to lag length and temporal stability. A modified likelihood ratio statistic was used for both purposes.12 Analysis of the time frame of response processes showed that six, three, and two monthly lags were needed for the models with COPDAB, WEIS, and ASHLEY time series, respectively; that is, the great powers' past behaviors affect subsequent behaviors for no more than two to six 24 months (see Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 71, 168 As for the temporal stability of SinoSoviet-U.S. relations, many possible periodizations and "break points" have been proposed by students of great power politics. Most of these are defined by leadership regimes in each country and major international incidents in which great powers were involved. We examined the stability of our models across all U.S. and Soviet leadership transitions and across several key Chinese and international episodes. The results of these stability tests suggest three break points at which patterns of behavior among the three countries changed: the early 1950s, the late 1960s, and the early 1980s. We based our analysis for each data set on the longest period of overall stability of coefficients. In the COPDAB analysis, the instability of the late 1960s appeared to be only temporary, with no permanent, significant change of coefficients; hence, we analyzed the period of overall stability from April 1953 to December 1978 (309 months Thus, our analysis was based on weakly, but appropriately, specified models in terms of both lagged terms and stable coefficients. Again, our goal was to determine which of the theoretical propositions-routine, rational expectations, or reciprocity-best describes great power relations for all three models, each model being based on relatively independent measures of great power behaviors.14
Results
The results of the F-tests for the three models are reported in Table 1 . They show considerable evidence of bureaucratic routine and provide support in certain instances for rational expectations theorists' claim that great power behaviors approximate random walks. There is also compelling evidence, however, that great powers respond to the behaviors of other great powers.
Consider, first, bilateral responses-the tendency for one country's behavior toward another country to depend on the other country's prior behavior toward it. There are six possible bilateral responses among the three countries. In the COPDAB model, four of the six bilateral relations are statistically significant at the .05 level; in the WEIS model three of the six bilateral relations are statistically significant at the .05 level, and a fourth relationship is statistically significant at the .10 level; and in the ASHLEY model two of the six relations are statistically significant at the .05 level, and a third is statistically significant at the .10 level. Figure 1 summarizes these results.
In addition, there is evidence of triangular responses, but interestingly only for the Sino-Soviet dyad. As in Starr's (1982) analysis, actions by and toward the United States affect Soviet and Chinese behavior toward each other. Of the many possible triangular influences, those affecting Sino-Soviet relations accounted for almost all the significant triangular effects in the three models (see Figure 2) . These results contradict the first and second propositions. They imply quite strongly that great power behavior is not solely an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine or of other internal factors. Nor are the three countries' behaviors consistent with "idealized" or sophisticated rational expectations; U.S., Soviet, and Chinese behaviors do not appear to be random walks. Rather, each country reacts to the actions of at least one other country in a way that reflects a mix of routine and reciprocity. Some support for the rational expectation theory is evident in the matrices of contemporaneous correlations (Table 2 ). The matrices show that in a bilateral sense, the "innovations" or shocks in the three countries' behaviors are correlated. For example, the residuals from the equations for USt and SUt are correlated at about .50 in all three data sets. But the residuals for the equations corresponding to triangular linkages in the behavior of the great powers are not highly correlated contemporaneously (even where lagged responses give significant F-tests). For instance, the residuals for the equations for U.S. behavior toward the Soviets (USt) and for Soviet behavior toward China (SCt) are correlated at only -.09, .13, and -.09 in the three data sets, respectively. Likewise, the residuals for the equations for SUt and CSt are correlated at less than -.03. (Table 3) , we find essentially the same causal connections among the three countries' behaviors. We also obtain the same kinds of bilateral and triangular responses in simulations that employ a different ordering of our variables.15
Implications
Our analysis places the study of great power politics on much stronger empirical footings. We have identified serious specification errors in previously published research. We have shown that more than one monthly lag of variables must be included in models of great power relations and that temporally disaggregated (monthly rather than annual) measures reveal direct causal connections among the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. We have shown the importance of including behavior by and toward China in studies of great power politics and have identified an important asymmetry in the nature of the strategic triangle composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. We also have shown that most existing studies employ incorrect periodizations of great power relations; the time frames of these studies span periods of structural instability. Hence, the coefficient estimates in these studies are most likely inaccurate. Our investigation, by contrast, is based on specifications that are much less likely to be in error; it covers time frames that by all indications are structurally stable. Our results are generally robust for three separate data sets on great power behavior and for a data set based on hostile behavior only. Our findings about the nature of great power politics are thus sounder than previously reported findings.
Our results are of substantive and theoretical importance. To begin with, they confirm the existence of a strategic triangle in which China plays a key great power role, especially in relation to the Soviet Union (see Lynch 1987; Robinson 1987; Starr 1982) . However, our analysis shows, contrary to some works (e.g., Dittmer 1981) , that this triangle is characterized by a distinctive asymmetry, in which only the Sino-Soviet dyad is directly affected by triangular influences. The continuity in this triangular asymmetry from the 1950s to the 1970s implies that the strategic triangle took form long before scholars and policymakers became preoccupied with it (see Kim 1987;-Segal 1982).
Our results yield new insights about great power policy making. They clearly illuminate "reactive links" between the behaviors of the three countries-links that belie the notion that great power decisionmaking is purely self-driven by bureaucratic routine and related internal factors. The results provide some support for rational expectations theories insofar as they confirm that the innovations or shocks in the variables for U.S., Soviet, and Chinese (bilateral) relations are contemporaneously correlated. However, our findings also challenge these theories in revealing direct causal connections between the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Table 1) and an absence of contemporaneous correlations of residuals across equations corresponding to triangular responses (Table 2) Finally, our research defines an empirical battlefield for international relations theorists. For scholars who study international cooperation in terms of twoperson prisoner's dilemma games, our results challenge the idea that great powers actually play simple tit-for-tat strategies. We have identified pervasive reciprocity among the United States, the 30 Soviet Union, and China, providing heartening news for those who view reciprocity as a key norm underlying the possibility of international cooperation. But we have also shown that reciprocity operates in a more complex environment than most theorists realize, an environment with considerable bureaucratic routine as well as asymmetrical triangularity. Great powers appear to employ strategies that mix routine and reciprocity while responding, in some cases, to the behavior of third parties.
Our investigation also poses challenges for theorists who represent great power relations in terms of other kinds of games and models (e.g., Snidal 1985; Wagner 1983). A valid game-theoretic model of great power politics must predict the behavioral patterns we have found. In particular, such a model must predict bilateral reciprocity between the three countries, mixed with routine behavior in each country and triangular asymmetry with respect to Sino-Soviet relations. In general, our results suggest we should be studying three-person games with stylized asymmetries in payoffs along with elements of prisoner's dilemma-like incentives conducive to strategies of reciprocity (see Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 137-41) .
For psychological theorists of international cooperation (e.g., Jervis 1976), our research validates the "spiral model" of reciprocal response rather than the "deterrence model" of inverse response for the Cold War era. Our finding of strong bureaucratic routine in all three countries supports psychological theorists' claims about needs for sustained series of cooperative initiatives to overcome inertia (Osgood's [19621 "GRIT" proposal) and effective communication of one's willingness to cooperate (Larson 1988) . Also, our result about the consistency of reciprocity and triangularity over four decades implies that longstanding norms of reciprocity can lead to a great power security regime (Jervis 1981) . At the same time, our results call for the incorporation of new research on the effects of triangular asymmetry-more specifically, on the conditions under which subjects will modify behavior toward a second subject based on the latter's relations with a third subject. Our results also call for an account of the behavioral changes that occurred at the historical "break points" we have identified.
In these ways, then, our investigation provides a solid empirical foundation for the study of great power politics. It contributes to the development of more realistic and practical theories of international cooperation, and delineates the conditions under which such cooperation must be sought. While great power behavior is a complex and difficult subject, we have moved a step closer to understanding that phenomenon and thus strengthening both theory and policy. are the matrices of the cross-products of residuals for 32 the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. This is modified to be (T -k)(logIDR I -log ID, 1), where k is the total number of regression coefficients minus the number of equations in the model. See  Sims 1980, 17-18. 13. The results for the COPDAB data suggest a temporary period around 1965-70, in which the patterns of response differed from the rest of the 1953-78 period but which led to no permanent change in the following years. (Note, however, that the "noisy" nature of events data may mean that our statistical tests are unable to detect this structural change in the system.) Unfortunately the time ranges covered by our other data sets prevent us from determining whether the other two break points (the early 1950s and the early 1980s) also would appear "temporary" in a longer time frame. The full results for the stability checks and lag length tests are available from us.
Notes
14. Note that by not imposing the same lag length and not focusing on the identical time period for all three models, we create an even more stringent test for the propositions. If one of the propositions holds up across all of these models, we can be more confident of its validity than if we had imposed the same lag length and studied the identical subperiod for all three models. Note that the analysis periods of the WEIS and ASHLEY data sets do not even overlap, so that not only the measurement procedures but the actual historical events were different for these two analyses.
15. The results of the simulations with fitted VAR models have been known to change when the order of the variables is changed (see Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). However, our results are robust against alternative orderings of the variables. These ancillary results are available from us.
16. Rational expectations theory might be revised to account for our results, for instance, by assuming that great powers process information inefficiently. For example, the direct causal connections between countries' behaviors could be explained in terms of delays in their bureaucracies' processing observations of other countries' behaviors. Such an argument would require more systematic study and modeling of bureaucratic decisionmaking in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Majeski 1985 17. Again, the second of these did not create suffident instability in COPDAB coefficients to warrant breaking the 1953-78 period into two subperiods for analysis.
